Trust and Rule

Rightly fearing that unscrupulous rulers would break them up, seize their resources, or submit them to damaging forms of intervention, strong networks of trust such as kinship groups, clandestine religious sects, and trade diasporas have historically insulated themselves from political control by a variety of strategies. Drawing on a vast range of comparisons over time and spac...

Rightly fearing that unscrupulous rulers would break them up, seize their resources, or submit them to damaging forms of intervention, strong networks of trust such as kinship groups, clandestine religious sects, and trade diasporas have historically insulated themselves from political control by a variety of strategies. Drawing on a vast range of comparisons over time and space, Charles Tilly asks and answers how, and with what consequences, members of trust networks have evaded, compromised with, or even sought connections with political regimes.

查尔斯·蒂利曾任美国哥伦比亚大学约瑟夫·伯腾威泽

社会科学教授，曾在特拉华大学、哈佛大学、多伦多大学、

密歇根大学、社会研究新学院等校兼任教职；是美国国家科

学院、美国艺术和科学研究院、美国哲学学会、美国艺术与

科学促进会会员。近期出版的著作有： 《欧洲的抗争与民主

(1650一2000)》、《斗争的动力》(与道格·麦克亚当、

西德尼·塔罗合著)、《集体暴力的政治》等。