The Structure of Empirical Knowledge
How must our knowledge be systematically organized in order to justify our beliefs? There are two options--the solid securing of the ancient foundationalist pyramid or the risky adventure of the new coherentist raft. For the foundationalist like Descartes each piece of knowledge can be stacked to build a pyramid. Not so, argues Laurence BonJour. What looks like a pyramid is in ...
How must our knowledge be systematically organized in order to justify our beliefs? There are two options--the solid securing of the ancient foundationalist pyramid or the risky adventure of the new coherentist raft. For the foundationalist like Descartes each piece of knowledge can be stacked to build a pyramid. Not so, argues Laurence BonJour. What looks like a pyramid is in fact a dead end, a blind alley. Better by far to choose the raft.
Here BonJour sets out the most extensive antifoundationalist argument yet developed. The first part of the book offers a systematic exposition of foundationalist views and formulates a general argument to show that no variety of foundationalism provides an acceptable account of empirical justification. In the second part he explores a coherence theory of empirical knowledge and argues that a defensible theory must incorporate an adequate conception of observation. The book concludes with an account of the correspondence theory of empirical truth and an argument that systems of empirical belief which satisfy the coherentist standard of justification are also likely to be true.
Laurence BonJour is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Washington. He received his bachelor's degrees in Philosophy and Political Science from Macalester College and his doctorate from Princeton.
BonJour specializes in epistemology, Kant, and British empiricism, but is best-known for his contributions to epistemology. Initially defending coherentism in his an...
Laurence BonJour is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Washington. He received his bachelor's degrees in Philosophy and Political Science from Macalester College and his doctorate from Princeton.
BonJour specializes in epistemology, Kant, and British empiricism, but is best-known for his contributions to epistemology. Initially defending coherentism in his anti-foundationalist critique The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (1985), BonJour subsequently moved to defend Cartesian foundationalism in later work such as 1998's In Defense of Pure Reason. The latter book is a sustained defense of a priori justification, strongly criticizing empiricists and pragmatists who dismiss it (such as W. V. O. Quine and Richard Rorty).
In 1980, Bonjour criticized the reliabilism of Armstrong and Goldman, proposing internalist approach to epistemic truth and knowledge justification. He formulated the examples of a clairvoyant and her reliable forecasts about the presence of the U.S. president in New York City. Some years later, in his essay Externalist theories of empirical knowledge Bonjour extended his internalist criticism against the foundationalist theory, saying it was unable to provide enough reasons for justification and to solve the regress problem.